Very much the same idea resurfaced in modern times with the British idealists and Continental existentialists. The author reviews these antecedents, showing how his theory differs from those of his predecessors.

At a time when politics and virtue seem less compatible than oil and water, _Democracy and Moral Development_ shows how to bring the two together. Philosopher David Norton applies classical concepts of virtue to the premises of modern democracy. The centerpiece of the book is a model of organizational management applicable to the state, business, the professions, and voluntary communities.

At a time when politics and virtue seem less compatible than oil and water, _Democracy and Moral Development_ shows how to bring the two together. Philosopher David Norton applies classical concepts of virtue to the premises of modern democracy. The centerpiece of the book is a model of organizational management applicable to the state, business, the professions, and voluntary communities.

There is no logical bar to anybody becoming a fanatic, in Hare’s conception, because of the strict bifurcation which his logic of moral concepts imposes between the morality of interests and the morality of ideals. In the former sphere, the answer to the question "What ought I to do?" is guided by the logic of the term "ought." By its universal prescriptivism, what I ought to do is an action which exemplifies a maxim of action which similarly binds anyone in (...) relevantly similar circumstances. In the "idealist" sphere, what I ought to do in any circumstances is what accords with my ideal. In the "utilitarian" sphere, it is the universalizability requirement which distinguishes moral from non-moral acts and affords this same distinction regarding the interests and desires which spawn the acts. It performs this function because interests and desires are not intrinsically universalizable. But universalizability does not afford a moral criterion in the idealist sphere because ideals are inherently universalizable. The idealist is fully prepared to universalize his ideal and the behavior it prescribes in various circumstances. Because this is so, universalizability does not here function as a moral criterion, and the fanatic cannot be judged morally. It is here that "fortunate contingent facts" are adduced by Hare to take the place of moral arguments. (shrink)

Current debates over multiculturalism often pit those who believe that every perspective should be represented against those who hold fast to the notion of a universal "common ground." In this timely and original work, David L. Norton persuasively argues for the power of a "transcendental imagination," that is, an imagination that can go beyond itself to gain another's perspective without necessarily assimilating that perspective. Imagination, Understanding, and the Virtue of Liberality will be an important work for all intellectuals and very (...) useful in courses that address multiculturalism. (shrink)

IN Freedom and Reason, R. M. Hare identifies the requirement of universalizability as "that of finding some action to which one is prepared to commit oneself, and which at the same time one is prepared to accept as exemplifying a principle of action binding on anyone in like circumstances." In Ethics and Action, Peter Winch describes universalizability as the criterion "which would have it that a man who thinks that a given action is the right one for him to perform (...) in certain circumstances is logically committed to thinking that the same action would be right for anyone else in relevantly similar circumstances." And in a recent issue of Mind, Michael E. Levin says that the "original question" concerning the universalizability-criterion is "whether a man X can intelligibly judge that he ought to do A while refusing to commit himself to the claim that anyone else ought to do A.". (shrink)

To outward appearances, teleological description and explanation of human conduct have lately been regenerating themselves, phoenix-like, from the ashes to which they were reduced by positivism and behaviorism. In the words of Israel Scheffler, “Teleological explanations have, it is true, been largely expunged from the natural sciences, since it is no longer acceptable to attribute beliefs or purposes to physical objects. Such explanations are, however, of enduring relevance in the human sciences, history, literature, and everyday life, where the beliefs and (...) purposes of people are of major interest in characterizing and predicting their conduct.”. (shrink)

To outward appearances, teleological description and explanation of human conduct have lately been regenerating themselves, phoenix-like, from the ashes to which they were reduced by positivism and behaviorism. In the words of Israel Scheffler, “Teleological explanations have, it is true, been largely expunged from the natural sciences, since it is no longer acceptable to attribute beliefs or purposes to physical objects. Such explanations are, however, of enduring relevance in the human sciences, history, literature, and everyday life, where the beliefs and (...) purposes of people are of major interest in characterizing and predicting their conduct.”. (shrink)

A fantastic read for any scholar or student interested in philosophy, epistemology, or ontology.

To find more information about Rowman and Littlefield titles, please visit www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

Henry Thoreau boasted that he was widely travelled in Concord, Massachusetts. He was born there on 12 July 1817, and he died there on 6 May 1862, of tuberculosis, at the age of forty-four years. In 1837 he graduated from Harvard College, and in 1838 he joined Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and others in the informal group that became known as the New England Transcendentalists. The author of four books, many essays and poems, and a voluminous journal, he is (...) best known for the book Walden and the essay ‘Civil Disobedience’, and for the circumstances attending these two milestones in American thought and literature. (shrink)

Henry Thoreau boasted that he was widely travelled in Concord, Massachusetts. He was born there on 12 July 1817, and he died there on 6 May 1862, of tuberculosis, at the age of forty-four years. In 1837 he graduated from Harvard College, and in 1838 he joined Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, and others in the informal group that became known as the New England Transcendentalists. The author of four books, many essays and poems, and a voluminous journal, he is (...) best known for the book Walden and the essay ‘Civil Disobedience’, and for the circumstances attending these two milestones in American thought and literature. (shrink)

This level-raising contribution to the theory of interpretation is marked by sophistication, soundness, scrupulosity, and good sense.

With care and conviction, Kolenda makes the case that Rorty is not the mortician he has been mistaken for, preparing the entire corpus of prior Western systematic thought for burial. Rather, Rorty has positioned himself to serve as midwife to the birth of promising and necessary new worlds.